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Abstract
Recent work has established a framework for explaining the origin of cognitive novel-
ties—qualitatively distinct cognitive traits—in human beings. This niche construction
approach argues that humans engineer epistemic environments in ways that facili-
tate the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of such novelties. I here argue that
attention to the organized relations between content-carrying informational vehicles, or
informational form, is key to a valuable explanatory strategy within this project, what
I call structural-causal explanations. Drawing on recent work from Cecilia Heyes,
and developing a case study around a novel mathematical capacity, I demonstrate
how structural-causal explanations can contribute to the niche construction approach
by underwriting the application of explanatory tools and generating new empirical
targets.
Keywords Cognitive evolution · Cultural evolution · Novelties · Explanation
1 The niche construction approach
Human beings display a range of cognitive novelties—qualitatively distinct cognitive
traits—as compared to our closest living ancestors. Among many such traits, the
capacity to read, write, engage in mathematical reasoning, and attribute mental states,
are substantiallymore sophisticated thanwhat is found in other animals. In part because
of their distinctiveness, the origin and development of cognitive novelties represent
explanatory targets for researchers—and serve as ground zero for debates between
nativist and empiricist accounts of cognition.
This paper develops one empiricist approach to explaining cognitive novelties.
Absent any agreed-upon label, I call this the niche construction approach. Empha-
sizing the role of environmental activity, the niche construction approach holds that
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human beings engineer stable, information-rich, organized epistemic environments
that facilitate the development of cognitive novelties. Though encompassing a range
of scientific disciplines, heterogeneous methods, and various spatiotemporal scales,
researchers adopting the approach nonetheless hold a number of common assumptions.
These are:
1. That powerful evolutionary feedback loops select for traits that can exploit and
engineer informational domains. Starting with a cognitive profile much like extant
Panins, only small tweaks to social tolerance, executive control, working memory,
and attention are needed to facilitate an increased reliance on social learning.1
Such social learning could in turn co-evolve with the increasing availability of
information generated by conspecifics.2 This dynamic feedback loop could further
exaggerate the sociality and cognitive flexibility of ancient hominins, amplifying
the sophistication, organization, and effects of activity throughmodified life history
traits (e.g. longer adolescences, increased reliance on alloparenting), means of
resource capture and processing (e.g. distributed systems of labor, sophisticated
collaborative hunting), and economic exchange (e.g. extended kinship).3
2. An explanatory emphasis on epistemic features of human cognition and the world:
human beings are characterized as epistemically opportunistic agents who flexi-
bly adopt strategies and exploit cues to extract high-quality information relative to
their goals. Information is interpreted broadly as the epistemically salient aspects
of learning and teaching, object properties, and scenarios—and is thus carried
by varied material vehicles (speech, bodily movements, artefacts, etc.).4 This
inclusive characterization allows for investigation into ways agents and hetero-
geneous information-carrying vehicles together constitute salient informational
assemblages. Such assemblages may be ephemeral (as when teachers simplify
actions or problems to suit the abilities of learners (Flynn et al. 2013)), persist for
days or weeks (as when individuals leave material cast-offs or trace evidence in
the environment (Sterelny 2012)), or generate enduring organized structures (as
with language (Clark 1997) or artefacts (Hutchins 1995)).
3. Lastly, an evolutionary narrative whereby increasingly sophisticated human cog-
nition is tied to capacities for engineering and exploiting structured informational
domains. Here, relationships between social and technological change lead to
increasingly enriched and organized informational environments. So, for instance,
increased population size can create variation in the quality of informational
sources, providing opportunities for learners to attend to more capable models,
and thus facilitating the dissemination and improvement of skills and techniques.
Enlarged population sizes can also support expanded suites of tools and techniques
1 Key to such claims are themodels and research fromBoyd andRicherson (1985, 2005). Similar arguments
can be found in Sterelny (2003) and Heyes (2018).
2 Classic articulations of coevolutionary relationships between social learning and information landscapes
can be found in Henrich and Gil-White (2001) and Henrich and McElreath (2007), however the importance
of such relationships for human evolution has been most comprehensively explored by Sterelny (2012).
3 For helpful summaries of the coevolutionary relationships between cognition and other traits, see:
Tomasello (2014) and Henrich (2016)
4 This epistemic framing is especially prevalent in the work of cultural evolutionary researchers, as noted
by Lewens (2015) and Buskell (forthcoming).
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that can be combined and recombined to increase and improve technologies.5
Improved skills and technologies in turn can facilitate greater resource capture
and, as a result, larger population sizes that support even better skills, tools and
technologies. As effective population sizes increase and the sophistication of skills
and technologies improve, hominins gain increasing ability to change both their
lifeways and theworld; transforming their social organization, strategies of trophic
exchange, bodies of knowledge, and technological sophistication.
I think the niche construction picture of human evolution, development, and cognition
is powerful and compelling. By emphasizing the ways in which human activities
can enrich their epistemic environments—and in so doing, set off a number of powerful
feedback relationships—the approach represents an important andplausible alternative
to nativist accounts of human cognitive evolution (e.g. Barrett 2015).
Circumventing this entrenched debate, my present aim is to develop a power-
ful, as yet insufficiently articulated, explanatory strategy available within the niche
construction approach. This structural-causal strategy explains the development of
cognitive novelties by showing how an individual’s inferences and manipulations can
come to reflect the organized relationships holding between informational vehicles
in their environment. In other words, cognition can come to mirror the structure, or
informational form, of organized assemblages.
The structural-causal strategy draws on work from embodied and distributed cogni-
tion, cognitive ecology, and ecological psychology.6 Onekey insight of these literatures
is that the organization and flow of information is important for understanding both
the development of cognition and its occurrent functioning. Structured informational
domains like material artefacts, linguistic systems, or workshop apprenticeships can
facilitate the acquisition of abilities and regulate their deployment—and here I extend
this point to help explain cognitive novelties. Nonetheless, this paper is not intended
as a contribution to these literatures. My focus is on cognitive capacities whose mature
functionings are not constitutively reliant upon external scaffolding.7 This leaves open
the possibility that such capacities may involve a substantial embodied component—a
possibility I return to later. Still, there is a contrast to be drawn between the capacities
at issue here and the many examples in the above literatures where capacities are con-
stitutively reliant upon ongoing engagement with a structured world. My focus is on
the former because they provide striking examples of persistent cognitive reorganiza-
tion, and because the core targets of the niche construction approach—at least mind
reading, language, selective social learning, and imitation—are taken to be instances
of such persistent cognitive reorganization.
My strategy for articulating informational form and its role in structural-causal
explanations of cognitive novelties begins by engaging with Cecilia Heyes. Heyes’s
5 Links between demography, cultural change, and cultural sophistication have been modelled by Henrich
(2004), Powell et al. (2009), Kolodny et al. (2015), and Fogarty and Creanza (2017).
6 Especially the works of Clark (1997, 2003, 2008); Hutchins (1995, 2010); Malafouris (2013); and Sutton
(2010).
7 I leave open how ‘maturity’ should best be construed. A natural reading, in line with a link I draw to
skills later in the paper, characterizes it in terms of proficiency or mastery. I thank an anonymous referee
for pressing me on this issue.
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recent work has developed a powerful model for explaining cognitive novelties using
the mechanisms of cultural evolution. Though Heyes is something of an uncomfort-
able bedfellow with the niche construction approach, her work bears several of its
hallmarks, notably: the appeal to structured information domains embedded in mate-
rial and social props, the iterative improvement of such domains through deliberate
activity, and the role of discriminating epistemic agents.8 Because of this, explor-
ing Heyes’s machinery is valuable for expanding the reach of the niche construction
approach—indeed, one way of understanding this paper is as an attempt to analyze
and integrate the two.
I begin by outliningHeyes and herwork on the cultural evolution of cognitive novel-
ties. As I suggest, her framework presents a puzzle; by strictly distinguishing cognitive
hardware from informational input, Heyes undercuts a substantive role for exogenous
information in the development of new cognitive functioning. Yet by exploring a case
study in mathematical cognition and Heyes’ own work on imitation, a different pic-
ture emerges: one where learning can lead a mirroring of the structured organization
of information in the world. In the final sections, I suggest what model of cognition
might underpin this learning, and explore how structural-causal explanations might
be developed further.
2 Culturally evolved cognitive novelties
Thework ofHeyes (2012a, b, 2018, 2019) is at the forefront of explaining the evolution
of distinctively human cognitive novelties. Before I begin sketching her approach, I
note thatHeyes’swork is expansive. Itmarshals a range of empirical research, develops
new conceptual machinery, and touches upon issues in many literatures. I thus cannot
give a comprehensive treatment of her account and focus on those aspects central to
the explanation of cognitive novelties.
Heyes’s targets are novelties deep within the hominin lineage—what she calls ‘cog-
nitive gadgets’—that support cumulative and adaptive cultural evolution.9 Like niche
construction researchers, Heyes argues that only small changes to ape-like cognition
were needed to kickstart evolutionary processes culminating in cognitive novelties.
Like niche construction researchers, Heyes believes that such evolutionary processes
were amplified as hominins increasingly came to rely on social learning and collec-
tive enterprise within groups. And like niche construction researchers, Heyes argues
that cultural evolutionary processes can create sophisticated and adaptive bodies of
skills, tools, technologies, and institutions.What is distinctive about Heyes is her claim
that cultural evolution can generate changes in cognitive functioning—that cultural
evolution can generate cognitive novelties.
8 Heyes’s (2019) few remarks on the subject have been skeptical of the explanatory significance of niche
construction. Moreover, Heyes (2018) argues for a ‘force theory’; a generalized schematic for explaining
human cognitive novelties. She takes this to be distinct from accounts which provide narratives of the
phylogenetic or ontogenetic origins of novelties. She might thus resist being characterized as a niche
construction researcher, not least because her force theory appeals to abstract features of cultural traits and
processes (her ‘Campellian’ approach to cultural evolution, discussed below) rather than the activities of
human agents.
9 For Heyes these include (at least) mind reading, selective social learning, language, and imitation.
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At this point, it is helpful to step back and distinguish two mechanisms by which
cultural evolutionmight possibly change cognitivemachinery. The first is gene-culture
coevolution. This occurs when cultural practices modify selection pressures, leading
to shifts in genetic frequencies. The second occurs when cultural evolution processes
(selective social learning, imitation, cultural recombination) lead to cumulative change
in the adaptiveness of practices and technologies. Niche construction researchers
appeal to bothmechanismswhenexplaininghumancognitive evolution.Heyes’model,
however, shows the power of the latter: mechanisms of cultural evolution themselves
might explain the origin and improvement of cognitive novelties—no change in genes
required.
Heyes sees cultural evolution as strongly analogous to biological evolution.
This approach—what she calls a ‘Campbellian’ after the work of Campbell
(1965)—assumes that cultural variation is constantly produced, is randomwith respect
to fitness, and that fitness determines downstream frequencies of cultural traits in
populations (Heyes 2018, pp. 32–36). Here, ‘fitness’ is indexed to cultural traits
and measures their effects on the relative reproductive (that is, biological) success
of individuals. Lastly, Heyes takes mechanisms of cultural group selection and cul-
tural diffusion to be the predominant means by which cultural traits spread (ibid.,
pp. 198–203).10 Taken together, these elements provide a schematic representation of
what Heyes calls a ‘force theory’; an idealized sketch of the salient causal processes
of cultural evolution that can generate cognitive novelties responsible for downstream
cumulative cultural evolution.
There are two important epistemic and conceptual moves underpinning this
schematic that are worth drawing out. The first is an explanatory focus on the adap-
tive role of such mechanisms. As Heyes notes, she is “interested in adaptedness, why
some cognitive mechanisms do their jobs better than others.” (2019, p. 2) What is
important is not just the evolved function of such capacities, but also how different
variants of such mechanisms do better or worse at fulfilling such a function, and thus
increase or decrease biological fitness. As mentioned above, Heyes appeals to Camp-
bellian cultural evolution and cultural group selection as mechanisms for explaining
such adaptiveness. I pick up and analyze this adaptationist line of thought in the next
section.
The second important move concerns individuation and the conceptualization of
cognition; the means of differentiating cognitive novelties for empirical research.
Heyes sees contemporary accounts of cognitive science as providing such means.
As she writes:
cognitive mechanisms (mills) are unitized by cognitive science, and, within the
framework of cognitive science, different versions of a mechanism—different
variants—can be distinguished according to what they do and how they do it; the
kind of information they process, and the computations they use (Heyes 2018,
p. 38).
Roughly, cognitive science provides the means for identifying different mechanisms,
their function, and the kind of information that these mechanisms typically process.
10 I note that Heyes’s appeal to selectionist (‘Campbellian’) cultural evolution and cultural group selection
is contentious (e.g. Lewens 2015; Morin 2019).
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In adopting the strategy, Heyes takes on board a standard distinction between cog-
nitive mechanisms and their informational inputs: cognitive novelties are cognitive
hardware that are functionally individuated by cognitive scientists and that perform
operations on information-bearing vehicles of content (the inputs).
The contrast between mechanistic functioning and informational inputs is embed-
ded in Heyes’s distinction between ‘grist’ and ‘mills’. Grist is information expressed
or embodied in behavior: the use of a particular tool, style of dress, notion of appro-
priateness, or the like. It is “what we do and make, and the contents of thought” (2019,
p. 2), what can be “‘taken in’ (and produced by) human minds.” (2018, p. 37) Mills,
by contrast, are cognitive mechanisms. As noted above, these are individuated by cog-
nitive science according to the specific function they underwrite, and variants of these
can be better or worse at their job.11
The mechanism/input distinction generates a puzzle. Heyes argues that cultural
evolution is a process that selects for fit, information-bearing vehicles that generate
novel cognitive mechanisms. By adopting a mechanism/input distinction, however,
Heyes undercuts the plausibility of that picture; for if information can only be an input
to a mechanism, then how could it influence the development of that mechanism?
Heyes is committed to the claim that we learn mindreading, imitation, and rules for
social learning—but the conceptual machinery of her account makes mysterious this
banner claim.
Let me put this another way. What Heyes requires is an account of cognition and
cultural evolution whereby cognitive novelties emerge from learning processes sensi-
tive to the organized structure of informational domains. But equating novelties with
the brain-bound mechanisms of mature individuals directs attention away from such
processes, and suggests that exogenous information only factors as grist to canalized
mechanistic mills.
Can the organization of exogenous information play such a difference making role
in generating cognitive novelties? I think that it can. To make space for such a role, I
first turn to consider how cognitive novelties should be conceived.
3 Cognitive novelties and informational form
Cognitive novelties are one kind of evolutionary novelty; qualitatively distinct
complexes of form and function (Love 2008).12 To adopt a maximally inclusive for-
11 Is the underlying cognitive picture provided here committed to classical computational cognitivism?
The distinction at issue, between cognitive mechanism and informational input, is what Haugeland (1998)
calls a ‘family’ feature of representational approaches to cognition (as opposed to features of specific repre-
sentational genera). As I see it, such generic representationalism is amenable to cognitivist, connectionist,
and predictive processing treatments, and the points argued for here are meant to apply broadly. This is
not to say that representationalism is uncontentious. Recent enactivist work, for instance, has developed
interesting critiques of the explanatory power of representationalism (e.g. Malafouris 2013). I am grateful
to two anonymous reviewers who pressed me on these issues.
12 It is worth noting that Love (2008) uses the terms ‘innovation’ and ‘novelty’ to refer to distinct functional
and formal divergences respectively. I have not followed Love in this terminology to avoid confusion.
Within the cultural evolutionary literature—which this paper draws upon—this distinction is not made, and
‘innovation’ is often operationalized to refer to any functional or formal change to a trait.
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mulation, ‘functions’ are relationships of means-ends fittedness between a system and
purposes, while ‘form’ consists in the structural relationships, or organization, among
elements composing such a system. Under this permissive formulation, evolutionary
novelties can emerge, and indeed are found, at varying scales from the proteomic to
the morphological.
The identification of novelties is sensitive to description. Novelties described from
one anglemay not be so from another. This is a feature and not a bug. Such description-
dependence underwrites the comparative logic by which evolutionary researchers
distinguish, situate, and explain novelties using relevant contrast groups. For most
comparisons, biologists appeal to close phylogenetic neighbors at the same taxo-
nomic rank. Thus, elephant trunks are novelties among ungulates, and feathers among
chordates.
Novelties are interesting empirical targets because they mark off different ways of
living; supporting distinct capacities and reflecting unique evolutionary histories. And
while researching putatively unique traits requires scientific ingenuity, researchers ask
fundamentally the same set of questions about novelties as they do of any other trait:
‘how did it evolve?’, ‘how does it typically develop?’, and ‘what is its function?’. The
same questions apply to human cognitive novelties: novelties are compelling empirical
targets because they support distinctive human lifeways.13 They are also tricky to study
because of their putative uniqueness. Nonetheless researchers can and do investigate
them, employing a wide range of theoretical and empirical strategies to understand
their origin and evolution.
We sawaboveHeyes’s strategy for approaching these empirical questions: cognitive
science individuates novelties by identifying their functions, while cultural evolution
(particularly group selection) is the mechanism by which means-ends fittedness can
be improved over time.
A functionalist and adaptationist approach is not the onlyway to pursue evolutionary
and developmental questions about novelties, however. Evolutionary developmental
biologists, for instance, emphasize organismic form and the role of constraints in
facilitating viable and adaptive organisms. They do so by adopting a range of formal
and empirical methods, identifying how heterogeneous elements (genes, transcrip-
tion factors) enter into dynamic causal relationships where activation profiles play a
crucial explanatory role.14 The main takeaway for current purposes is that valuable
understandings of traits can result when they are understood as emerging from an
underlying system of organized elements—many of which only exert an influence for
a short period of time.
13 I note that the adaptationist line of thought articulated here is not committed to a unilineal view of
human or cultural evolution as, say, articulated by classical sociocultural evolutionists (Stocking 1987) or
the overtly racist theorists of the post-reconstruction United States of America (Baker 1998). Instead the
adaptationist position at stake here is one where a wide variety of systematic causes (including cultural
evolutionary ones) can generate cognitive mechanisms (which may arise through learning) that display
means-ends fittedness for specific tasks, which themselves may vary from culture to culture. I thank an
anonymous reviewer for voicing their concerns on this point.
14 For an overview of evolutionary developmental biology, see Carroll (2005). For an evocative concrete
example of both the heterogeneity of elements appealed to and the complex causal relationships involved,
see Martin et al. (2016) on the regulatory elements involved in the development of the crustacean limb.
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Here I argue that an analogous approach can be used to explain the cultural evo-
lution of cognitive novelties. The general idea is that developmental environments
contain heterogeneous vehicles of informational content (external artefacts, linguistic
labels, the behavior of other agents) organized in systems. And just like in cases of
evolutionary developmental biology, the structural relationships between these vehi-
cles can make a difference to the development of cognitive skills, even if they are only
present for short periods of time.
To help make these points more intuitive, I develop a case study that draws attention
to the difference-making role of this informational form in structural-causal explana-
tions. In this example, informational content is important but insufficient to explain the
development and operation of the cognitive capacity at stake. Attention to the organi-
zation of information-bearing vehicles in the material nature of external props, bodily
movements, and long periods of effortful learning is also required. After exploring
this case study, I return to consider structural-causal explanations and informational
form in more general terms.
3.1 Abacus-basedmental calculation
The case study looks at abacus-based mental calculation (AMC), an impressive capac-
ity where skilled practitionersmanipulatemental representations of abaci to efficiently
solve mathematical equations. One of the remarkable features of such skilled practi-
tioners is the speed and reliability of their calculations. Priyanshi Somani, for instance,
is an exceptionally skilled AMC user who won the overall title at the Mental Calcu-
lation World Cup in 2010. This achievement is impressive given the difficulty of the
tasks: the addition trial alone required computing ten questions with ten ten-digit
summands in under three minutes.15 AMC is extraordinary—but how does it come
about?
Using abaci as part of mathematical instruction is standard practice across a number
of Central and East Asian communities. But developing capacities for AMC requires
instruction, practice, and commitment beyond standard education. Frank and Barner
(2012) for instance, carried out ethnographic and experimental studies on AMC stu-
dents in Gujarat province, India, where the program is a three-year after school course.
The most widely used abacus in these programs is the Japanese soroban abacus
(Fig. 1). This abacus is divided into two horizontal sections, separated by a beam.
Run through this beam are a number of bead columns, which typically represent
increasing base ten units (ones, tens, hundreds, etc.). The bottom section—below the
horizontal beam—contains four ‘earthly’ beads, each representing one decimal (base
ten) unit of the respective column. The upper section contains a single ‘heavenly’ bead,
representing a quinary (base five) unit. When beads are moved towards the horizontal
dividing beam they are put ‘into play’, and represent a particular numerical quantity.
The material character of the abacus is important for a number of reasons. The first
has to do with the general representational character of abaci. Representing numer-
ical quantities with beads is manifestly different than numerical notation (e.g. the
15 For a sample list of questions and competition instructions, consult https://www.recordholders.org/en/
events/worldcup/.
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Fig. 1 Children completing at the 25th Annual Soroban Contest in Tokyo. Public Domain Image (United
States Air Force)
inscription ‘22’) even if the quantities represented are the same. These representational
differences are particularly salient with regards to calculating algorithms. Carrying out
mathematical operations (e.g. addition, multiplication) on abaci means learning a dif-
ferent set of algorithms than those involved in carrying out the same operations using
pen and paper (Overmann 2018). A second important material feature of abaci is that
they are reliable tools. Unless someone jostles or shakes the abacus during the process
of calculation, the abacus can be reliably manipulated through intermediate steps to
complete algorithms. Third, algorithms involve the bodily manipulation of material
beads, and these manipulations can be made fluid and transparent over time. Though
learning such algorithms may have initially involved deliberate movements and the
double-checking of results, successive practice can routinize these actions until they
are effortlessly exercised.
Although the use of abaci can involve routinized movements, this does not mean
that using the abacus is trivial, or that all cognitive operations can be automatized.
Consider another problem Somani had to solve at the Mental Calculation World Cup:
computing a cubed root. The algorithm for carrying out such a calculation on an
abacus is demanding. Even with a physical abacus, the algorithm requires the user
to mentally subdivide bead columns into three distinct sections, partition the target
number into three-digit tuples, and perform iterative cycles of division and multipli-
cation. Nonetheless, despite the complexity of the algorithm, effortful practice can
123
8542 Synthese (2021) 198:8533–8553
decrease cognitive demands by routinizing the bodily manipulations required within
each section and partition.
What is extraordinary about AMC, however, is skilled practitioners can carry out all
the same calculations and algorithms as normal abacus users in the absence of an exter-
nal abacus. AMC practitioners internalize the content carrying vehicles, manipulating
visual representations of beads and their movements in working memory.
Three pieces of evidence support the claim that AMC practitioners manipulate
imagistic representations abaci in working memory. The first is that AMC practi-
tioners have access to the intermediate stages of computation. Stigler and colleagues
(1986; Stigler 1984), for instance, found that AMC practitioners were able to identify
whether a particular arrangement of beads would be moved through when solving a
particular problem. The second is that AMC experts are much more likely than non-
abacus-using calculators to make computational errors involving multiples of five.
This, they suggest, is because AMCusers internalize a representation of the ‘heavenly’
bead—which, recall, represents a quinary (‘base five’) unit—that when erroneously
manipulated can explain the effect.
Lastly, Frank and Barner (2012) introduced distractor tasks to interrogate the nature
of the representational content—with AMC practitioners and controls either carrying
out verbal (repeating a story) or motoric (drumming fingers) distractor tasks, while
requiring subjects to mentally compute two-digit summands. All AMC practitioners
performed better than controls carrying out mental addition, and some were able
to perform perfectly. This can be explained if AMC calculators are manipulating
imagistic representations of abaci rather than linguistic ones.
But what exactly do these manipulations consist in? One hint comes from looking
at the role of motor behavior in calculations made with the abacus present. Donlan
and Wu (2017) show that the number of operations using complementary numbers
in different bases—that is, those involving manipulations of both the quinary (base
five) ‘heavenly’ bead and decimal (base ten) ‘earthly’ beads—correlates with solving
speed. Both expert and non-expert abacus users are slower to solve problems when
they involve more complementary number operations. This demonstrates that even
when motor patterns underlying algorithms are mastered, they are not automatized,
and continue to require monitoring and control. (Fridland 2014, 2017).
When one turns to consider AMC, bodily manipulations continue to play an impor-
tant role:AMCcalculators continue tomake fingermovements and gestures evenwhen
manipulating mental abaci; these gestures are exaggerated as tasks becomemore diffi-
cult, and; motor interference tasks do have a negative influence on performance (Frank
and Barner 2012; Brooks et al. 2014). This suggests that motor behavior plays non-
trivial role in the actualization of AMC abilities. This is unsurprising: abaci algorithms
are constituted by the movement patterns of beads. Even when manipulating imagined
abaci, the manipulation of beads seem to be in accordance with the manipulations that
would have taken place on physical ones.
To sum up, AMC is a cognitive novelty: it represents a distinct kind ofmathematical
capacity. It can be applied to a range of mathematical tasks in an incredibly impressive
and robust manner. Yet the development and operation of these capacities is seemingly
best explained by learners acquiring standards and motor routines for manipulating
organized, information-bearing material vehicles. AMC practitioners further learn to
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apply these standards and motor patterns to imagistic representations of these vehicles
through further effortful training.
To put it bluntly, the development of AMC capacities cannot be explained by point-
ing to informational content alone—the quantitative content that the beads represent.
As the above account makes clear, material, bodily, cognitive elements and their inter-
relation are needed. Over hundreds of hours of experience, first with real abaci, and
then increasinglywithout, individuals cultivate embodied skills formanipulating abaci.
These same skills are then used to manipulate imagistic representations that mirror
the material organization of abaci beads, and may be increasingly routinized, though
not automatized, over time. Explanations for AMC need to appeal to the material
character of the soroban abacus (particularly its combination of quinary- and decimal-
base beads grouped in columns), the development of specific bodily skills, the nature
of representations manipulated in working memory, and long effortful learning and
internalization.
3.2 Further reflections on form
The case study on AMC is an evocative illustration of what I mean by ‘informational
form’: here, the structured information embedded in the organization of the soroban
abacus. It also illustrates how structural-causal explanations work. Over hundreds of
hours of practice, the cognition of AMC practitioners comes to mirror the structural
features of the abacus. But how might these explanations work more generally? How
can the organization of informational domains play a difference making role in pro-
ducing cognitive novelties?
Recall above I identified a feature of Heyes’s account that renders the relationship
between exogenous information and the development of cognitive novelties mysteri-
ous: a strict separation between cognitive mechanisms and informational input. This
seems to undermine a positive role for exogenous information in the development of
cognitive mechanisms. I also noted that Heyes focuses on adaptation, highlighting
how different mechanisms can be better or worse at fulfilling specific functions.
The above case study reveals that for at least some cognitive novelties, a synchronic
functionalist perspective can obscure important causal factors during development.
This is because (as is familiar from work in evolutionary developmental biology) ele-
ments critical for trait development may be ephemeral and not present in mature traits.
Thus, while a physical soroban abacus is crucial for developing AMC, practitioners
do not need one once they have achieved proficiency. A focus on the synchronic func-
tioning of hardwired mechanisms would thus miss the crucial developmental role of
external props (Clark 2008).
Just as importantly, the above case study show that learners grasp of the organized
relationships between the material vehicles of information is key to explaining the
capacities they develop. Agents acquire more than bare informational content—more
than just a mapping relationship between bead positions and numerical quantities.
AMC practitioners acquire the ability to recognize and manipulate internalized vehi-
cles of information, and to do so in ways that embody some standard of correctness.
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The routinized skills they acquired to manipulate physical abaci are put to use manip-
ulating imagined ones.
As such, the structural-causal strategy explains cognitive novelties diachronically:
emphasizing both extended periods of development and the possibility of important
yet transitory elements. It also emphasizes informational form in the sense that the
cognitivemechanisms develop a similar ‘shape’ or structure to that of the informational
assemblage agents engage with. Form in this sense is meant to echo how the term is
used in evolutionary developmental biology.
Importantly, such an explanatory approach does not repudiate functionalist or adap-
tationist approaches to the evolution and development of novelties. The two may in
fact be complementary: a focus on the mirroring of form illuminates how structured
elements and relationships serve as plausible targets for selective processes. Such
complementarity is familiar from the philosophy of biology. Calcott’s (2009) lineage
explanations, for instance, demonstrate how organized systems (his ‘biological mech-
anisms’) are productive constraints on natural selection, limiting viable variation. The
elements and organization of these systems are nonetheless the targets for adaptive
change. As Calcott argues, it is the combination of two explanatory strategies—devel-
opmental and evolutionary—that best explains how gradual changes to an underlying
system lead to the eventual production of specific novel phenotypes.
The moral is that including structural-causal explanations in one’s tool kit does not
mean taking out all the adaptationist ones. The two are not exclusive.Understood on the
model of lineage explanations, the structural-causal explanations of cognitive novelties
articulate the (sometimes ephemeral) elements and relationships that constrain the
development and evolution of cognitive novelties. Taken togetherwith our best theories
of cultural and biological evolution, such a strategy can help to explain the possible
and actual evolutionary trajectories of human cognition.
4 Exogenous information and cognitive novelties
With these resources in hand, I return to consider the motivating puzzle of the second
section—what is the relationship between exogenous information and cognition such
that the former can cause transformative change in the latter? Here I consider and reject
two prominent formulations from the cultural evolutionary and distributed cognition
literatures. In the next section, I’ll return to Heyes and suggest that her work on imi-
tation provides a promising way forward, despite the methodological and conceptual
caveats made above.
The two formulations I consider in this section share a common feature: that the
environment serves as a repository of information, and that what is interesting about
exogenous information is the quantity of information that can be stored. Unsurpris-
ingly, an overarching concern with the quantity of information tends to downplays the
importance of how such information is organized.
The first formulation takes exogenous information to be predominantly symbolic,
and is found in the environment where individuals have made inscriptions on objects.
The content of such inscriptions can later be recovered by means of interpretation.
This is a view familiar in mainstream work within the cultural evolutionary literature.
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Boyd and Richerson (2005), for instance defend the view that while “some cultural
information is stored in artifacts,” they are quick to assert that without “writing […]
artifacts can’t store much information” (61) This view is echoed by Mesoudi (2011,
p. 3) who makes the point more explicit: externalized information is embedded in
“extrasomatic codes such as written language, binary computer code, and musical
notation.” Given that symbolic extrasomatic codes are a recent human invention, this
means that for much of human evolution “the most important aspects of culture still
tend to be those stored in our heads.” (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 62).
The second prevalent formulation of exogenous information takes it to consist in
cues or evidence—either about the state of the world, or a relevant set of causes—that
are recovered through processes of inference. This approach sees information in the
world as available for use in the orientation, guidance, and fluid deployment of behav-
ior. This guidance might be mundane; as ordinary as following in previously set-down
footpaths through heavy brush. Yet it can also be more complex and involved, as when
one uses a spear-thrower as a template for making another spear-thrower. (Sterelny
2010) Distributed cognition theorists have long been impressed by this on-demand
interactionwith information in theworld. Their examples—for example, of distributed
memory strategies (Tribble 2005; Sutton 2010) and the savvy use of physical manip-
ulation (Clark 1997)—reveal how human beings offload information onto people,
places, and things, in ways that can influence later behavior.
The two approaches depict the relationship between exogenous information and
cognition differently. For Boyd and Richerson, and indeed for many other cultural
evolutionary researchers, information is externalized through deliberate inscription
and storage. Information repositories can later be consulted, double-checked, and
amended. Yet the implication of this view is that one cannot store a great deal of
it until the development of a combinatory and recursively structured code, as with
written forms of language.
By contrast, the views of Sterelny and distributed cognition theorists hold that
exogenous information is widespread—visible in the many traces of successful and
unsuccessful human action in the world. This sees exogenous information as avail-
able for guiding future behavior, prompting the deployment of skills, and even being
internalized into cognitive routines. Putting it evocatively, this is view that Andy Clark
describes as being “promiscuously body-and-world exploiting [[…]] forever testing
and exploring the possibilities for incorporating new resources and structures deep
into their embodied acting and problem-solving regimes” (Clark 2008, p. 42).
Empirical evidence supports the importance of both formulations, yet recent work
has tended to emphasize the importance of the latter, distributed view of informa-
tion (Clark 2008; Sterelny 2012; Malafouris 2013). While human beings did and
do inscribe information, it is not the case that environments were information-poor
until the widespread use of symbolic inscriptions. Indeed, the fluid and flexible use of
exogenous information extends deep into hominin history. Human beings of a hundred
thousand years ago had already developed sophisticated technological toolkits, control
of fire, collaborative hunting practices, tracking techniques, and stoneknapping skills.
And modern accounts describing the development of these skills emphasize how they
require long, effortful practice, picking up on cues and information from teachers, the
environment, and the artefacts themselves (e.g. Wadley 2010; Hiscock 2014).
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Nonetheless, even on this richer understanding, it is hard to recover a route by
which exogenous information plays a difference-making role in the development of
cognitive novelties. If anything, it makes the puzzle even harder. For if human beings
are constantly engaged in offloading information onto the environment, perhaps inter-
acting with these resources in clever on-demand ways, it is hard to see how this would
later translate into radically altered cognitive machinery. Though distributed cognition
researchers are right to hype the various ways in which human beings cleverly inter-
act and exploit the world—often increasing performance capabilities and decreasing
performance demands—this is not yet an account of how novel cognitive traits come
about.
5 Imitation, associative sequence learning, and form
In several areas of Heyes’s work, she follows something like the distributed view of
informational offloading: culturally evolved technologies, teaching strategies, social
interaction, and environmental cues guide infants in the acquisition of novel cognitive
functioning. Exogenous information, on this picture, provides reliable and readily
available scaffolding that facilitates the acquisition of cognitive novelties.16 Yet when
Heyes turns to consider imitation—the cognitive novelty which she herself has spent
a great deal of time investigating (i.e. Heyes 2001; Catmur et al. 2009; Ray and Heyes
2011)—a distinct kind of relationship between exogenous information and cognition
emerges.
Imitation is the capacity for the faithful copying of another’s observed bodilymove-
ments. This is a cognitively sophisticated capacity requiring topographicmapping from
the observed actions of agents onto first-person sensorimotor experiences. This is non-
trivial, and the current indication is that human beings are unique in the sophistication
of and their reliance upon imitation.17
Heyes’s account for the emergence of topographic mapping capacities is her Asso-
ciative Sequence Learning (‘ASL’) model. On this model, topographic mappings are
producedwhen observed behavior becomes linked to first-person sensorimotor experi-
ences underwriting similar behavior. These links are ‘vertical associations’, a “sensory
representation of an action linked to amotor representation of the same action”. (Heyes
2018, p. 107) Such links can be made and strengthened according to standard models
of associative learning. As learners develop, they require more and more fine-grained
16 Heyes (2018) argues that children grown up in environments rich in structure and information; that they
encounter a wealth of stimulus rather than a poverty of the stimulus. Suffice it to say, Heyes believes that data
from developmental psychology refute brute-causal accounts where the origin of cognitive mechanisms or
concepts are triggered by exogenous stimuli (Fodor 1981).
17 I note that this claim is contentious, in part because the researchers differ in how the explanatory target
is characterized (a feature of the literature that Heyes (1993) has critiqued). Speaking generally, there is a
tendency within the primatological research to study ‘imitative behavior’ which encompasses a broad range
of observation-action relationships, including emulation, acquisition of ritualized behavior, the ‘automatic’
production of learned behavior, and a range of other social learning processes. For some recent reviews and
evidence surrounding primate imitation, see Subiaul (2016) and Clay and Tennie (2018).
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vertical associations, gradually acquiring more and more competence in mimicking
behavior.18
In explaining how and why such vertical associations are prevalent enough such
that human infants reliably acquire imitation, Heyes employs the tools of the niche
construction approach. One route for establishing vertical associations runs from
teachers and parents to children. Caregivers often mime the sounds, movements,
and expressions of infants—providing the contingent temporal association between
infant’s sensorimotor experience and observed behavior. Another route runs between
infants and cultural props. Mirrors, and perhaps other artefacts, can similarly provide
sensorimotor feedback for forming vertical associations.
One implication of Heyes’s account is that, were vertical associations to change,
different kinds of topographicmapping functionswould occur. That is, if a learnerwere
to systematically associate raising their left hand when a model raises their right hand,
they would form a topographic relationship between the two. Here, the input/output
profile of associative actions is systematically changed, leading to a modified suite of
vertical associations. Experimental results support this supposition. Even spontaneous
‘automatic’ imitation, where observed behavior leads to the unreflective production of
the same behavior, can be trained away or caused to generate ‘counter-imitation’—not
unlike raising my left arm in response to you raising your right arm (Heyes et al. 2005;
Catmur et al. 2009). As Heyes (2018) notes, “imitation can be diverted by relatively
brief periods of sensorimotor learning, in which people are exposed to mismatched
and arbitrary relations between observed and executed actions” (116).
This is important. Whether or not the ASL model is a complete account of imi-
tation—or merely a sketch of one central component (Subiaul 2016)—it embodies
a radically different kind of relationship between exogenous information and cog-
nitive mechanisms. According to the ASL model, there is a direct correspondence
between input/output profile of observed action/sensorimotor behavior and the func-
tional capacity of agents. Indeed, Heyes account suggests that the two are identical:
distinct training regimes generate distinct topographic mappings.
This picture of information repudiates Heyes’s distinction between grist and mills.
Recall that for Heyes, grist are discrete ideas, practices, and technologies: “what we
do and make, and the contents of thought” (2019, p. 2). Grist are distinct from mills,
or cognitive mechanisms, which describe “the way or minds work” (ibid.) As I said
above, this is a picture amenable to the idea of information offloading—that the world
is rich in information which can be reconstructed and inferred by the grinding mills
of mentation. But it is also a picture where the relationship among vehicles of infor-
mation is not seen as relevant to developmental explanations of cognitive capacities.
Information is just out there in the world, waiting to be fed into cognitive mechanisms.
All this changes on the ASL model. Here the grist of exogenous information—one’s
reflection in mirrors, the mimicking behavior of parents and caregivers—end up cre-
ating a profile of observed actions linked to sensorimotor experience. It is attention to
this informational form, the relationships holding between observed action and sen-
sorimotor experience, that is needed to explain the emergence of imitative capacities.
18 Imitation is taken to be regularly established in infants by six to eight months of age—though the precise
timing is contentious (Oostenbroek et al. 2016).
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6 Skills and internalization
Heyes study of imitation is useful for understanding how exogenous information can
factor into explanations of cognitive novelties. Of course, the ASL model is a simple
one, operating at very low level of perceptual and sensorimotor processing. As such it
will not always be a perfect fit for understanding how informational form can factor
into explanations of other cognitive novelties. AMC is case in point; explanations
of it seemingly require pointing to internalized imagistic representations and fluidly
executed motor routines. Still, I think the model is helpful. Here I want to outline how
the examples marshalled up to this point help to illuminate the cognitive capacities
underwriting structural-causal explanations.
First, the ASL model further reinforces the need to consider cognitive novelties
diachronically, as generated through temporally extended developmental regimes.
Moreover, as the niche construction approach makes clear, such regimes can involve
interaction with a wide range of cultural props, deliberate teaching, and structured
environments, all of which can facilitate the transfer of information. And as stated
above, a diachronic perspective may also be needed to identify the necessary but
ephemeral role of heterogeneous elements.
Secondly, the ASL model directs attention onto agents’ grasp of the relationships
holding between elements in a structured informational domain. Cognitive novelties
can emerge when agents’ cognitive systems come to mirror the exogenous infor-
mational domain, and when such agents acquire the standards for manipulating and
engaging with such domains. With AMC, these are inculcated by giving simple exam-
ples, problem sets, and constructive feedback. Practitioners are taken to be competent
when they can reliably produce correct answers to mathematical queries, and explain
the steps and reasons for having such answers.
Third, these acquisition processes are demanding, and this explains why long peri-
ods of effortful practice are often required for developing cognitive novelties. Though
it seems mundane, this is an important point, and in focusing attention on effortful
practice I am explicitly linking the development of cognitive novelties to the litera-
ture within the niche construction account that emphasizes the role of skill in human
cognitive evolution (Sterelny 2012).
Birch’s (mans.) skill hypothesis, for instance, holds that hominin cognitive evolution
was driven in part by capacities for complex motor and craft skills. As Birch argues,
there is good archaeological evidence for the deep history of skill in the hominin
lineage; especially for the construction of sophisticated lithic tools like Acheulian
bifaces. Constructing such tools requires the iterative application of knapping tech-
niques, evaluation of on-going progress, and insight into the form and function of the
final product. On Birch’s account, the deployment of skills is underpinned by cogni-
tive control models. These dynamic models represent the causal features of the skill
domain, anticipate the effects of sensorimotor activity, and respond to mismatches
when they occur. To use Birch’s language, responses to mismatches encode standards
of correct performance: representations of the expected dynamics of a causal domain
and means to bring those dynamics back into line.
Given the nature of the paleoanthropological evidence available, Birch develops
his account using examples of motor skill. Yet he speculates that the skill hypothesis
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may have a broad explanatory remit; arguing that the selection for skill may explain
the origin of human norm psychology. As he suggests, only small tweaks would have
been needed to expand cognitive control models to explain how standards of correct
performance might be applied to social phenomena like collaborative hunting, kinship
norms, and resource management. If Birch is right, then the ubiquity of human norms
may in part be explained by an expansion of skill psychology into the regulation of
social affairs, and that norms might be usefully explained by appealing the same kinds
of anticipatory corrections first developed to produce lithic tools.
This is still a hypothesis. Nonetheless, Birch’s account provides an important plat-
form for thinking about the emergence of cognitive novelties. Under this framework,
cognitive novelties might be understood as routinized inferences or manipulations of
informational vehicles, carried out in accordance with standards for correct manipu-
lation. They may even continue to involve motor skills, as seems to be the case with
AMC. And just as with motor skills, cognitive novelties can be understood as being
the result of training regimes: long spans of effortful practice that take advantage
of exogenous information and occasional tutelage in an environment engineered for
epistemic transfer.
7 Conclusion
The AMC case study involves not only the learning of algorithmic motor patterns and
standards for correctly manipulating information-carrying vehicles, but the internal-
ization of those vehicles in imagistic representations. It is this relationship—where
the information form in the environment is mirrored in cognitive processing—that
can generate cognitive novelties, and which structural-causal explanations target. My
suspicion, though one I cannot pursue in great detail here, is that other cognitive nov-
elties would also be illuminated by structural-causal explanations. Both Heyes and
Sterelny (2003), for instance, have argued that mindreading capacities are learned,
pointing to evidence that shows exposure to mental state lexical items is necessary for
fully-fleshed mindreading capacities, and that competence correlates with exposure to
narratives and explanations employing such mental state terms.19
The idea that cognition comes to mirror structure in the world is not new. Dennett
(1991), for instance, makes a similar point when he discusses language acquisition.
For Dennett, language installs a ‘virtual serial machine’ on the parallel processing
circuity of the brain, tweaking “myriad microsettings in the plasticity of the brain.”
(219) Like Heyes’s story, this is one where “relatively small hardware differences […]
allow us to both create and benefit from public language and other cultural develop-
ments in ways that lead to a great snowball of cognitive change” (Clark 1997, p. 198).
Nonetheless, even if the ideas here are not new, they take on added importance and
salience within the niche construction approach. It is not just language that radically
19 Heyes distinguishes between explicit and implicit mindreading (Heyes and Frith 2014; Heyes 2018).
Explicit mindreading capacities allow for reconstructions and deliberations over actions—both one’s own
and other’s—using mental state terms. Implicit mindreading, by contrast, encompasses a suite of predis-
positions and mechanisms for orienting towards agents and intentional action. When Heyes and Sterelny
argue that mindreading capacities are learned they mean explicit mindreading capacities.
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transforms human cognition, but potentially a whole host of culturally evolved gad-
gets. They do so by exploiting plastic, skill-oriented cognition to mirror the form of
exogenous informational assemblages.
Let me conclude by noting where the analyses of this paper have not yet reached. I
began by noting the broad framework of the niche construction approach, and promised
to say something about the evolution of cognitive novelties.As I’ve argued, attending to
informational form is a valuable investigatory strategy—at least when one is aiming to
explore variety in cognitive capacities seen among contemporary human populations.
Indeed, I have focused exclusively on extant populations. This leaves openwhether the
explanatory strategy outlined here can be projected back into the evolutionary record.
Both AMC and ASL demonstrate the demanding empirical and ethnographic work
needed to reconstruct informational form. Nonetheless, the wealth of techniques for
gaining access to past climates, materials, and techniques should make us optimistic
that the current account can be extended deep into the human record. Experiments
with contemporary populations to recreate the skills and skilled development of ancient
techniques (e.g. Stout 2002, 2011; Stout et al. 2008); increasingly sophisticated tools of
paleoclimatic, paleobotanical, and archaeological science, and; rich narrative accounts
of paleoanthropological life together provide convergent lines of evidence that might
allow the reconstruction of ancient informational forms.
There are benefits to doing so. As suggested above, structural-causal explanations
illuminate the relationship between form and function, particularly the constraints
of form on adaptive change. This means that the informational form appealed to in
structural-causal explanationsmight also serve as a potent target for cultural evolution:
irregular organization canbemade regular; information canbe better designed tomatch
our sensory and motor capabilities, and; teaching and learning strategies can lead to
more reliable acquisition and internalization. Artefacts in particular come into view
as potent targets for investigation. As material loci for cumulative change—whether
understood in terms of increased efficiency, manipulability, systematicity, or the
like—artefacts are both stores of information and platforms for further tinkering,
experimentation, and innovation. Over time, and in negotiation with plastic cogni-
tive systems, artefacts can facilitate the emergence of cognitive novelties like literacy,
numeracy, or AMC (Malafouris 2013; Overmann 2016). In short, taking informa-
tional form itself as an adaptive target opens up a new avenue for cultural evolutionary
research—and further shows the value of structural-causal explanations for the study
of human cognitive evolution.
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